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WELLS was struggling to sell some flats. He mentioned this to a neighbour, 
who put Wells in touch with Devani. Wells and Devani spoke over the 
telephone. The trial judge found that Devani told Wells that he was an estate 
agent, and his usual commission was 2% + VAT. Wells agreed to this, but the 
parties did not expressly agree upon what was to trigger the commission. 
Devani subsequently introduced a purchaser to Wells who bought the flats. Was 
there a binding contract between Wells and Devani? The trial judge found that 
there was, but the majority of the Court of Appeal, surprisingly, overturned that 
decision ([2016] EWCA Civ 1106, [2017] Q.B. 959, noted [2018] C.L.J. 22). 
The Supreme Court has sensibly allowed the appeal: Wells v Devani [2019] 
UKSC 4.  
 The majority of the Court of Appeal thought the contract was incomplete 
because an essential term, namely the event which was to trigger the 
commission, still had to be agreed. That view was strongly rejected by the 
Supreme Court and orthodoxy restored. It is often the case that crucial terms, 
such as the price, are not expressly agreed, and the court can imply a term that a 
reasonable price be paid (see e.g. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.8). As Steyn L.J. 
observed in G. Percy Trentham Ltd. v Archital Luxfer Ltd. [1993] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 25, at 27: 
The fact that the transaction was performed on both sides will often make 
it unrealistic to argue that there was no intention to enter into legal 
relations. It will often make it difficult to submit that the contract is void 
for vagueness or uncertainty. Specifically, the fact that the transaction is 
executed makes it easier to imply a term resolving any uncertainty, or, 
alternatively, it may make it possible to treat a matter not finalised in 
negotiations as inessential. 
In Wells v Devani, Lord Kitchin (with whom Lords Wilson, Sumption, 
Carnwath and Briggs agreed) similarly emphasised (at [18]) that “the courts are 
reluctant to find an agreement is too vague or uncertain to be enforced where it 
is found that the parties had the intention of being contractually bound and have 
acted on their agreement”. Courts may, perhaps, not be so willing to dismiss 
concerns of vagueness or uncertainty where an agreement is wholly executory 
(cf. May and Butcher v R. [1934] 2 K.B. 17), but that was not the case in Wells 
v Devani. The Supreme Court rightly held that the contract was sufficiently 
certain and complete, and that the commission had to be paid upon completion 
of the transaction. 
 The most interesting aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision lies in the 
route taken to reach that result. Unlike the trial judge and Steyn L.J. in Percy 
Trentham (quoted above), Lord Kitchin preferred to base his reasoning upon 
interpretation rather than implication of terms. Yet Lord Kitchin recognised that 
there was no express term regarding the precise event which would entitle 
Devani to his commission. Given the lack of an express term, what was being 
interpreted? Lord Kitchin thought that the parties agreed that the commission 
was payable on finding a “purchaser”, and that a string of cases regarding estate 
agents showed that “purchaser” should reasonably be understood as requiring 
completion of the sale. But often a party may be considered to be the 
“purchaser” upon exchange of contracts, and the trial judge did not find that the 
term “purchaser” was agreed (transcript, para. 2.2). In the Court of Appeal, 
Lewison L.J. – recognised by Lord Briggs in the Supreme Court (at [58]) to 
have “a pre-eminent standing in relation to the interpretation of contracts” – 
adopted a more orthodox approach in observing that ([2016] EWCA Civ 1106, 
[2017] Q.B. 959 at [39]): 
If one is to interpret a contract, the first question (where the contract is 
oral) must be: what words were spoken? The judge made a clear finding 
of fact that nothing was said about the trigger event. Thus in my judgment 
this route entails the interpretation of words that, on the judge’s findings, 
were never spoken. 
It is perhaps significant that Wells v Devani concerned an oral contract. (Indeed, 
by not providing Wells with his written terms of business before undertaking 
any work, Devani failed to comply with his obligations under the Estate Agents 
Act 1979 and the judge held that the amount recoverable by Devani should be 
reduced by one third. Both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court refused to 
overturn the judge on this point, although space precludes further consideration 
of the issue.) Most commercial contracts, however, are in writing; Chitty on 
Contracts (33rd edn, 2018, para. 13-041) accurately states that interpretation 
“denotes the process … by which a court arrives at the meaning to be given to 
the language used by the parties in the express terms of a written agreement”. 
The focus of interpretation should be upon the express terms of the contract. 
Interpreting silence is inherently ambiguous and prone to error. 
 The same result in Wells v Devani could have been reached through 
implication. Indeed, Lord Kitchin recognised that if the contract, on its proper 
interpretation, did not provide for a trigger event then a term that the 
commission be paid upon completion “must be implied to make the contract 
work and to give it practical and commercial coherence” (at [29]). Whereas the 
majority of the Court of Appeal had thought that a term could not be implied to 
complete the contract, the Supreme Court adopted a much more pragmatic 
approach. Whether a contract is sufficiently certain or complete should be 
assessed once all the express and implied terms have been ascertained. Lord 
Kitchin even said that “it is possible to imply something that is so obvious that 
it goes without saying into anything, including something the law regards as no 
more than an offer” (at [33]). This is sensible, and any suggestions to the 
contrary that might be found in cases such as Scancarriers A/S v Aotearoa 
International Ltd. [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 419 (PC) and Little v Courage 
Ltd. (1995) 70 P. & C.R. 469 should no longer be followed. 
 The decision of the Supreme Court raises once again the relationship 
between interpretation and implication. A broad approach to interpretation risks 
swallowing up much of implication. This was a potential consequence of 
Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 1 
W.L.R. 1988, but the Supreme Court in Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas 
Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd. [2016] UKSC 72, [2016] A.C. 742 
helpfully insisted that interpretation and implication should be kept distinct. 
Lord Neuberger said (at [27]): 
When one is implying a term or a phrase, one is not construing words, as 
the words to be implied are ex hypothesi not there to be construed; and to 
speak of construing the contract as a whole, including the implied terms, 
is not helpful, not least because it begs the question as to what 
construction actually means in this context. 
By contrast, in Wells v Devani their Lordships were effectively construing the 
contract as a whole. But the distinction between interpretation and implication 
should not be blurred. Whereas all express terms have to be interpreted, no term 
should be implied unless necessary to do so. And terms which are implied into a 
contract still need to be interpreted. 
Unfortunately, the guidance provided by the Supreme Court on matters of 
interpretation continues to vacillate. Lord Sumption has observed, extra-
judicially, that decisions such as Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 
1619 have signalled a shift in emphasis towards the natural meaning of 
contractual language, and away from relying upon the importance of 
background factors (compare the approach adopted by Lord Hoffmann in cases 
such as Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v West Bromwich Building Society 
[1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 and Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] 
UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 1101). Yet Lord Sumption also recognised that 
although “the Supreme Court has begun to withdraw from the more advanced 
positions seized during the Hoffmann offensive” it has done so in “muffled 
tones” (“A Question of Taste: The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of 
Contracts” (2017)  https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170508.pdf). 
Perhaps the retreat should have been sounded more loudly. In Wells v Devani, 
Lord Briggs said (at [59]) that “the context in which the words are used, and the 
conduct of the parties at the time when the contract is made, tells you as much, 
or even more, about the essential terms of the bargain than do the words 
themselves”. The context of these remarks is, in turn, important: Wells v Devani 
did not concern a written contract, let alone a detailed agreement drafted by 
lawyers which is typical in commercial litigation. Nevertheless, Lord Briggs’ 
remarks chime much better with Lord Hoffmann’s approach than with Lord 
Neuberger’s more recent leading decisions in cases such as Arnold v Britton and 
Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas which have (it is suggested sensibly) 
stressed the primacy of the language chosen by the parties. Such tension in the 
authorities is regrettable, and it is to be hoped that it does not relaunch an 
apparently endless stream of appeals on points of interpretation to our apex 
court.  
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